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Abstract 
 
Smart services have potential to improve value 
creation and profitability of industrial firms and their 
customers. Defined as services that go beyond the 
upkeep and upgrades, traditionally bundled with 
products and helping companies to build intelligence—
that is, awareness and connectivity. Combined with 
digitalization, services have had a major role in 
improving efficiency of existing offering and enabling 
new channels for service delivery. 
Implementing the change toward smart services is 
challenging. Research shows that especially industrial 
companies maintain institutionalized beliefs and 
attitudes impeding the transformation, lack capabilities 
and resources for implementation, and face industry-
wide norms and relationship practices resisting the 
change. 
The study explores the barriers in adopting smart 
services and is implemented as a multi-case study 
among six globally operating industrial companies. 
Our findings indicate classification of internal 
barriers, capability gaps, and external barriers, 
contributing a framework that describes the interplay 
between institutional forces and capability 
development in organizational change. 
1. Introduction  
Smart industrial services [1], [2] are services that 
are enabled and influenced by information that 
different industrial devices and processes generate, 
store and transmit to enable efficient operation, 
optimization, analysis and integration of business 
functions. Industrial services in general are often 
classified into categories of maintaining (product) 
functionality, ensuring operational availability, 
maintaining and improving performance, integrating 
processes, and operating production [3]. Each of these 
categories is affected by digitalization [4]. 
While research has studied the service 
transformation of industrial companies, few studies 
have explored the impact of digitalization of industrial 
services and moreover the institutional and 
organizational barriers that might complicate the 
comprehensive change. To fill the gap, this study 
explores the barriers to the development, launch, and 
implementation of smart services within manufacturing 
organizations. To address our research objective, we 
conducted a qualitative multi-case study among six 
globally operating industrial companies, which have 
already made significant investments in smart service 
development. The study was conducted as interviews 
in different industrial sectors. The findings identify 
three levels of barriers to the industry-wide adoption of 
smart services. The findings also suggest strategies for 
firms to overcome the barriers. The analysis illustrates 
the interplay between institutional inertia and dynamic 
capabilities during unfolding of the change. Further, 
our results suggest ways and approaches for managers 
to overcome the institutional and capability barriers.  
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Barriers to change 
Overtime, organizations build culture, identity, and 
beliefs, which generally improve exploitation in stable 
market conditions. Thornton et al [5] define 
institutional logic as socially constructed sets of 
material practices, assumptions, values, and beliefs that 
shape cognition and behavior. The rules, norms, and 
beliefs surrounding economic activity define of enforce 
socially acceptable economic behavior [6]. Institutional 
logics serve as the interpretation schema for 
organizational actors, guiding their beliefs, attitudes, 
decisions, and actions [7]. The institutional logics 
include norms and values at the individual level, 
organizational culture and politics at the organizational 
level, and regulation and industry-side norms at 
organizational level [6]. Institutions are products of 
shared understanding of acceptable norms of activity 
[8]. A change in the logic depends on the endorsement 
of the new scheme of reasoning by the stakeholders 
involved in the exchange [9], [10]. In the case of smart 
services, the change requires a new identity supporting 
the new business logic involving smart services.  
Institutional literature argues that organizational 
fields are organized by a dominant logic [9], and 
institutional change is effectuated by a change in this 
dominant logic. Institutional change is viewed as a 
transition from one dominant logic to another [12]. 
Smart services fundamentally change the nature of 
customer-supplier relationships by often re-defining 
firm boundaries, introducing availability and 
performance-based agreements, performance-based 
pricing, and re-organizing firms’ resource and 
capability base. Each of these changes potentially re-
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brands the identity of the firm and shakes their power 
position toward the other business ecosystem members. 
Hence, successful implementation of smart services 
requires internal (organizational) and external 
(organizational fields’) adoption of new institutional 
logic. 
2.2 Overcoming institutional barriers 
A change of logic requires acceptance of the new 
scheme of reasoning by the stakeholders [8], [9]. In the 
case of smart services, such an endorsement requires 
the perceived legitimacy of the new types of services 
by the key stakeholders in both the customer and 
supplier organizations. Suchman [10] defines 
legitimacy as the generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. Pragmatic 
legitimacy is based on the self-interested calculation of 
an actor about the benefit or expected value of an 
activity on the expected performance of the evaluator. 
An organization may evaluate the legitimacy of smart 
services on the basis of the value created for the service 
provider. Conversely, moral legitimacy reflects a 
normative evaluation of the activities or the 
organization at large, whether or not the activity is 
considered to be “the right thing to do”, and in line 
with the identity of the organization. This involves 
acknowledging the benefits of the logic for all actors 
involved. In smart services the moral legitimacy can be 
defined by the given service strategy.  The cognitive-
cultural legitimacy depends upon the acceptance of the 
logic, based on what is considered desirable by the 
actors’ involved and other connected stakeholders that 
may influence their evaluations. So in essence how 
well does the given actor network follow the strategy 
set for the smart services?  To deal with these above 
listed institutional barriers, the institutional change 
literature suggests sensemaking and sensegiving as key 
mechanisms for facilitating the transformation [11]. 
Sensemaking refers to the meanings managers and 
employees construct during the attempted change of 
the offering portfolio, and the ways it is understood 
that the changes will affect the goals. Sensegiving on 
the other hand is a related process by which individuals 
attempt to influence the sensemaking of others toward 
a preferred redefinition of the reality [11]. Based on the 
research about legitimizing new schemes of 
interpretation in decision-making, we suggest that both 
organizational sensemaking and sensegiving play a key 
role in the introduction of the smart services within 
firms and organizational fields. 
2.3 Renewing the resource and capability 
base of a firm 
Organizations employ dynamic capabilities [12] to 
maintain and improve the match with market demands, 
as well as the operational capabilities to produce high 
quality products and services. Dynamic capability is 
defined as an organization’s capacity to create, modify, 
and extend its resource and capability base [12]. Two 
different parameters for measuring the effectiveness of 
dynamic capabilities are suggested, being the 
evolutionary- and technical fitness [12]. 
Evolutionary fitness denotes and measures 
organizations’ external fit with market demands and 
opportunities [12], [13]. Organizations that have high 
evolutionary fitness quickly adapt to emerging market 
opportunities or effectuate opportunities by creating 
and influencing market needs, or both. Evolutionary 
fitness is achieved by customer and market insight, 
learning, innovation, and successful introduction of 
new products and services that capture the emerging 
market opportunities. High evolutionary fitness may 
provide at least a temporary competitive advantage 
[14] unless other dynamic companies are equally quick 
to adapt. Previous literature has identified key 
capabilities and practices that support developing the 
evolutionary fitness. Launching novel services require 
careful customer selection, capabilities to gain 
customer insight by value research [15], [16], 
formulating the findings as value propositions [17], 
quantifying and convincingly communicating the value 
propositions, ability to engage and co-create value, 
verify and share the value created [18], [19], and 
leverage the outcome to effectuate an internal and 
external cultural change [20]. 
Companies may try to improve their evolutionary 
fitness either by adapting to current and predicted 
market demands, or by influencing the market demands 
in their favor [12]. Successful introduction of smart 
services may require both approaches. Value research 
driven discovery of new service opportunities or a 
broader market foresight analysis supports systematic 
development of likely valuable smart services, but a 
wider market success requires active influencing of the 
other business network members to increase the 
pressure on them to achieve the change in their 
institutional logic and resource and capability base. 
Technical fitness [12], [13] denotes and measures 
the quality of the (novel) products and services. 
Technical fitness affects evolutionary fitness. 
Companies may be quick to anticipate and/or create 
market demand, but the products and services created 
to service the demand may not meet customer 
expectations, or the required quality may be too 
expensive to achieve. Competitiveness then is the 
product of both - the evolutionary fitness and the 
technical fitness. Clearly an organization may excel in 
both, either, or neither of the fitness categories. Inward 
focused companies may excel in technical fitness, but 
end up offering high quality products and services, 
which the markets or consumers do not need. On the 
other hand an innovative and market-focused company 
may succeed in anticipating and responding to 
emerging market needs, but fail to create offerings that 
meet customer’s requirements. Long-term success 
requires both.  
3. Methodology 
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Our research was conducted as a multi-case study 
among six prominent, globally operating European 
industrial and technology companies. We investigated 
the unfolding of smart services development and 
rollout within its real-life context. The phenomenon 
qualifies as contemporary and evolving, hence 
justifying the exploratory approach chosen [21].  The 
multi-case approach provided analytical benefits over a 
single-case by enabling comparison and contrast of the 
results to find the distinction of case specific findings 
and the more general phenomena.  
3.1 Context of the study and case selection 
Industrial companies are expanding their scope of 
business by service transformation [22], expanding 
their offering from products to services and solutions, 
building the required resources and capabilities, and 
organizing accordingly. The drivers behind the 
strategic move include commoditization of the existing 
business, and promising future service business 
opportunities in forms of sustainable relationships 
enabled by the service offering. The transformation is 
not new, Fang et al [23] found that on average the 
share of service revenue rose from 8,9% in 1990 to 
42,2% in 2005 among manufacturing companies. 
All the case companies in our sample are 
multinational companies. The case companies operate 
in different industrial sectors and provide a wide range 
of products and services to their customers with 
varying degrees of service orientation. Studied 
industrial fields include transportation systems, 
measurement engineering, machine industry, 
agricultural engineering, building infrastructure, and 
industry automation. The wide range of industries 
provides valuable insights on smart service 
transformation in different contexts. The case 
companies were selected based on purposive sampling 
[21]; all the case companies have been implementing 
smart services. However, it was our aim to select 
companies that were in different maturity phases in 
their service transformation journey so that we could 
identify the barriers that were proven to be able to 
overcome as well as those that seemed to be only 
context specific and unique for given firm. The details 
of these case companies are described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Case company descriptions 
Firm Industry Sales Staff Smart service offering 
Alpha Transportation systems 
> 7 
000 > 25 
Commissioning, remote training, remote data transfer and handling, data 
warehousing. Visualization of data, data evaluation, remote condition 
diagnostics, performance contracting. 
Beta Measurement Engineering > 350 > 2 Commissioning, remote training, remote system upgrades. 
Gamma Machine Industry > 2 400 > 15 
Service platform, commissioning, remote data transfer, remote system 
upgrades, data evaluation, remote condition diagnostics, predictive 
services, performance contracting, data based benchmarking, data based 
consulting services. 
Delta Agricultural engineering 
> 3 
600 > 60 
Service platform, commissioning, remote training, remote data transfer, 
data warehousing, remote system upgrades, data visualization, data 
evaluation, automated data evaluation, remote condition diagnostics, 
predictive services, performance contracting, managed services, data 
based benchmarking, data based consulting services. 
Epsilon Building infrastructure 
> 9 
000 >50 
Service platform, remote data transfer, visualization of data, data 
evaluation, automated data evaluation, remote condition diagnostics, 
predictive services. 
Zeta Industrial products and services 
> 6 
000 >40 
IT hardware, software, and services; also advanced services, e.g. managed 
services for own and 3rd party hardware. 
 
3.2 Data collection 
The empirical data of this study consists of in-depth 
interviews with experienced senior managers in our 
case organizations. The interviews were carried out 
between January and June 2016, and each interview 
was between 40 to 100 minutes of length. The sample 
size matches the recommendations for exploratory 
research [28]. To enable the relaxed communication the 
informants’ anonymity was guaranteed through the 
assurance that the results would be released without 
any identifying information. It was perceived that 
anonymity encourages more candid discussion about 
successes and failures. Each interview was recorded 
and then transcribed verbatim. Following purposive 
sampling [21], the interviewees were chosen based on 
their role and experience, thereby most of them were 
sales, product, and service managers. To avoid single 
respondent bias, three or more managers were 
interviewed at each firm. 
After selecting the case companies and informants, 
semi-structured interviews with predefined themes 
were conducted; interview contents were continuously 
adapted on the basis of previous interviews [24]. The 
interviews consisted of open-ended questions, initially 
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crafted based on the literature review, and then 
modified and adjusted during the research process. All 
interviews were conducted face-to-face, and the 
transcribed data obtained from interviews was analyzed 
continuously during the research process. This was 
done in order to include or exclude the pre-defined 
themes that didn’t seem to resonate with our initial 
interview structure. Furthermore, after each interview, 
the analysis of the interview was emailed to the 
informant by email. The informant was invited to 
correct any misunderstandings and add any information 
that that he or she had forgot to mention during the 
interview. 
As case studies often apply abductive reasoning, 
our research process followed this paradigm, 
combining both inductive and deductive reasoning 
[25], [26]. Our study design involved simultaneous 
data collection and theory development, emphasizing 
an active interplay between theory and empirical 
evidence by going back and forth between the 
framework, data sources, and analysis [25]. Thus the 
objective of our approach was to match theory and 
reality in a nonlinear, path-dependent combination of 
empirical observations and theory. Hence, the research 
process of this study unfolded as an iterative process, 
characterized by the constant revision of the data 
collected, aiming to categorize the data according to 
the framework, which was initially derived from the 
literature and continuously adapted in the course of the 
research.  
The primary analysis technique used was cross-case 
synthesis, aggregating the findings of each case 
through a cross-case analysis, and involving a careful 
comparison of the findings from each case [27]. Thus, 
the similar themes across the cases, the differences 
among the cases, and the reasons for those differences 
were analyzed, resulting in the identification of the 
common themes that were perceived to be relevant in 
this study.  
3.3 Data analysis 
Our data analysis followed an abductive analysis 
process, where the understanding of the phenomenon 
based on the literature laid the foundation for early 
interviews, which then used evolving themes to track 
important issues as the interviews progressed and our 
understanding of smart services in the real-life setting 
increased [25]. In practice, prior literature informed us 
about the generic barriers relating to novel services 
[22], and the interviews explored how these or other 
emerging barriers were manifested in the case 
companies. While prior literature guided the initial 
analysis, we did not employ preconceived codes, but 
relied on open coding, which used in-vivo labeling, and 
described the emerging concepts based on the actual 
language used by informants [28]. Specifically, we 
coded both tangible activities and practices, as well as 
more intangible beliefs, assumptions, and attitudes that 
were considered to affect smart services, in order to be 
as inclusive as possible in gaining a rich understanding 
of the topic.  
Our data analysis started from the early 
observations [29], enabling us to structure our data into 
consistent blocks that reflect the emerging patterns in 
the data. This led to the identification of three 
categories of barriers, relating to the internally induced 
barriers, organizational capability gaps, and externally 
induced barriers to smart services. During the process 
we constantly revised our preliminary theory-based 
ideas of meaningful categories of data with empirically 
grounded insights of the barriers that impeded the 
adoption of smart services. We organized the data by 
using open and axial coding, and converting it to 
discrete thematic blocks that described the different 
types of barriers that the interviewed individuals 
experienced, the characteristics of each barrier, and the 
potential sense-making and sensegiving practices that 
managers used to overcome those barriers [28].  
The analysis progressed through a highly iterative 
process, where the emerging findings were constantly 
reflected and revised between and within the research 
team and the informants at the case company. The 
research team held several interim meetings, and 
several managers from the case companies audited the 
preliminary results and provided feedback during the 
research. The frequent exposition of emergent results 
to both managerial (deep and local, context-specific 
knowledge) and academic (broad knowledge from 
several contexts) audiences ensured that we had 
reached sufficient understanding of the research 
phenomenon and captured the breadth and depth of 
how managers experienced the barriers in their own 
social reality [30], [31]. 
Because qualitative case research is sensitive to 
researchers’ subjective interpretations, we used a 
variety of tactics to improve the quality of the research 
and the trustworthiness of the findings [21], [32], [33]. 
First, we used theoretical sampling and revelatory case 
logics to identify and gain access to empirical data that 
would provide theoretically and contextually rich 
insights in terms of the focal phenomenon. Second, we 
applied several forms of triangulation (theory, 
researcher, and data) to increase the credibility and 
validity of the study. In practice, we combined 
institutional and dynamic capabilities theories as our 
analytical lenses, used multiple researchers as co-
interpreters, and drew empirical insights from several 
key informants, and different sources of data. Third, we 
conducted frequent member checks and peer debriefing 
to reduce researcher bias and increase the objectivity of 
the study. Finally, by providing a rich set of direct 
interview quotations to demonstrate interpretations, we 
support the transparency and conformability of the 
findings. 
4. Findings 
Our analysis identified sixteen barriers to adoption 
of the smart services, classified as internal barriers, 
1645
  
capability gaps, and external barriers. The internal 
barriers resist change of mindset, beliefs, and identity 
[34]. The capability gaps represent the missing or weak 
capabilities and resources needed to successfully 
provide smart services i.e. meet the market 
requirements. Finally, the external barriers relate to the 
receptivity of the customers and the wider industrial 
network for the smart services and the changes in the 
relationship logic that the changes would bring about. 
The identified barriers are discussed next. 
4.1 Internal barriers 
Our analysis revealed three basic themes of internal 
barriers of which all reflects somehow the 
organizational culture and management principles. 
Services were seen to be very distinctive form the 
traditional, exploitative business and therefore the 
identity and legitimacy inhibited companies in their 
transition. 
Management culture: Our analysis revealed that 
the existing management culture often favors and 
rewards short-term achievements of product-based 
offering. Smart services represent complicated and 
difficult-to-evaluate offerings, for which the sales-
cycles are long and outcomes risky. We find that the 
management practices, goals and incentives reflect the 
prevailing product-focused culture, which firmly 
maintain the prevailing sales culture. The following 
quotes illustrate this finding. 
Internal marketing of the new service was an issue: The 
service culture was not yet developed correctly. We were still 
stuck in the mentality of being a product company. (Beta). 
 In addition, service technicians have to be included in 
these new technologies through different wages, incentives. 
(Delta) 
Identity: Many of the case companies have 
successful history and strong identity in their existing 
business. The customer-facing personnel identify 
themselves with the existing (mature and product-
dominated) offering portfolio.  
Selling services is much different than selling products. 
…We all (salespeople) are hired to sell products not 
services." (Zeta).  
Our smart service business grew organically; we had no 
clear development process. Service just did not have a lot of 
status at that time. (Beta).  
 It was a challenge and a struggle to convince people of 
smart services – they are used to the predictable lifecycles of 
products. Smart services with long product life seem 
complicated in comparison. (Beta). 
Legitimacy: Smart services often redefine the roles 
and responsibilities within the supplier companies, and 
expand the scope of the customer relationships. The 
new services are not a legitimate part of the offering 
portfolio or the relationship scope. 
We are a mechanical engineering company with service, 
not a service business. The service developed over time. 
Because of this, the whole mindset is not service-driven, but 
product-driven. We do have this problem. (Gamma).  
Dealers would simply refuse to bill customers for services 
they did not render at the customers’ site. (Delta).  
People resist [Smart Services] since they are something 
new, unknown. Something could happen, something could not 
work. [...] Hence the argument, I only act if something is 
truly broken. (Delta).  
Maybe the change is also between the ears, that we 
would sell something else than the traditional. (Zeta).  
People have to be won over. The internal need for 
discussions and marketing was much higher than expected 
and severely underestimated. (Delta).  
Mindset problem. The mindset problem comes with a 
resource problem. We simply do not have enough Smart 
Talents. (Gamma) 
4.2 Capability gaps 
As noted above, the organizational barriers were 
not, however, limited only to the organizational culture 
and identity but reflected also novel capabilities that 
companies did not necessarily posses. The capability 
gaps were mainly related to the technical problems and 
level of communication between the stakeholders but 
also the reconfiguration problems towards service 
orientation were recognized.  
Inability to provide smart services: Technical 
immaturity or outdated technology of the existing 
equipment fleet and incomplete support infrastructure 
are among the key reason preventing case companies 
from providing smart services. 
Technical problems led to anxiety among our customers 
and service technicians. [...] The worry, that systems break 
down – no worry, that people fail, don’t know what to do 
[...], but permanent worry about technology, that data gets 
lost, that something is disrupted, that something breaks 
down. (Delta).  
When we started with Smart Services, we didn’t have 
much to show. We only had few data and didn’t know if we 
should wait until we had more substance [...] You enter this 
vicious cycle [where the dealers say]: ‚Well, but I can only 
talk with the customer when I have this and that feature. 
(Delta). 
Access to influence: Generally, selling innovative 
new offerings requires access to influential and 
visionary decision makers, who are receptive to the 
benefits provided by the smart services. The existing 
business contacts of the case companies are often built 
to procurement units, which are not receptive to new 
ideas. 
The idea is to use key account managers that actively 
address these issues with decision makers at the customers 
and try to launch the whole thing. It’s definitely a challenge, 
because you have to make new connections to stakeholders. 
(Beta). 
Governance infrastructure: The internal IT 
systems, management systems, incentives, and 
organizational structures are built overtime and 
optimized for the existing product-based businesses. 
The existing infrastructure has been built over time to 
serve the existing business logic. As the requirements 
of the smart services provision and the needed 
capabilities and practices are significantly different, the 
existing structures do not serve the emerging logic 
well. 
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Roles and responsibilities should have been clearly 
defined much earlier. Initially, nobody knew who had what to 
coordinate. (Delta).  
It’s challenging in the product-oriented company where 
all the processes and systems support product-orientation. 
(Zeta).  
In addition, service technicians have to be included in 
these new technologies through different wages, incentives. 
(Delta).  
[When we started offering automated Smart Services] we 
had to define new processes. [...] We had to make rules that a 
ticket [initiated by a machine] gets treated the same way as if 
the customer had called himself. (Gamma).  
Initially we focused too intensely on the technical 
solution. The whole application of Smart Services was put on 
a level with the machine can send data. The typical way of 
thinking was that if the machine can send data, the work is 
done – and people will automatically take care of the data, 
analyze it and know what to do. (Epsilon).  
The only focus was the technical equipment that enabled 
the machine to send data. [...] Everything else was not 
considered – that you have to educate and inform people, that 
perhaps new tools are needed, that new processes are 
needed. That was all neglected. [...] This was surely the main 
reason that the earliest projects were never successful. 
(Epsilon) 
Lack of resources: The case companies often lack 
the necessary financial resources to implement the 
infrastructure for smart services. 
We only offer this [Smart Service] in markets, where we 
have the necessary downstream processes in our service 
organization well established. Nothing is more foolish than 
having a [predictive call] from a machine and no one acts on 
it. If this is the case, you lose more and faster than you can 
ever win. [...] The process includes the necessary resources 
you need to run it! If a market is too small, then we do not 
offer [Smart Services]. [...] I promise the customer a lot, if I 
cannot keep these promises I squander all trust. (Gamma). 
We simply do not have enough Smart Talents, i.e. 
personnel qualified for Smart Services. This resource 
problem goes hand in hand with a usage problem. If I had 
more customers for Smart Services, I could afford more 
resources. At some point I have to make the decision whether 
we believe [in Smart Services], then I have to commit 
resources, even when I don’t have any usage. (Gamma) 
Insufficient information on installed base: The 
case companies often have a significant installed based, 
but seldom sufficient and applicable installed base 
information to efficiently leverage it. 
Regarding complexity – what makes it [providing Smart 
Services] difficult for us is the long life cycle [of our 
products]. This makes it very difficult for us, this extreme 
diversity in the installed base. [...]. There is this huge number 
of components, where we cannot read out anything and do 
not even know what is installed at all. (Epsilon) 
Cost-Benefit of installed base modernization: Many 
of the case companies have built their installed base 
over time, and need to maintain outdated equipment. In 
many cases the cost of upgrading the installed base to 
support the smart services is prohibitively high. 
[Smart Services were pushed by the top management with 
the premise that no changes be necessary regarding 
organization, infrastructure, or additional technical 
equipment]. This had the disadvantage that we didn’t cover 
the old machines in the installed base, since we needed a 
specific software status. Even where old machines could have 
been retrofitted we didn’t do that. We made a cut. (Gamma) 
High product life times have an impact on the duration of 
time you can do service for. Initially you have the challenge 
to connect your big, relatively old installed base – and to 
what cost! If you can only transmit essential signals you have 
to ask yourself the question whether they are enough to offer 
preemptive services. (Epsilon) 
Unclear legal status of the information: Not 
surprisingly, the use of the industrial data represents 
significant challenges. 
Data belongs to the customer. Software, however, is our 
intellectual property. (Delta)  
Data that we receive from the customer is our property. 
However, we are under the obligation not to share the data 
with third parties. That’s clear, that’s an obligation. 
(Gamma) 
Inability to build value propositions: As a pre-
requisite for value communication, the companies face 
challenges in actually understanding what is valuable 
for their customers and building value propositions 
accordingly. Effective value propositions address 
customer’s timely business goals, and offer tangible 
evidence of value: 
 We had data but didn’t really know what to do with it. 
You have to understand the customers’ business, their pain. 
You have to connect an idea with this customer pain.” 
(Delta).  
The assumption that we know what to do and what the 
customer should do has failed. These things [Smart Services] 
have to be jointly developed. (Delta).  
We are really struggling to develop a value proposition. 
This technology is just emerging, developing. (Delta) 
Inability to communicate value: The existing 
customer relationships have been built around 
(physical) products and product innovations. The 
customer-facing staff lacks the confidence and 
capabilities to communicate value. 
 Our dealers cannot argument professionally. [...] They 
cannot conduct a professional sales pitch with arguments. 
They can all sell a [conventional product]. But I personally 
do not believe that they can sell one of todays’ [products]. 
These include such advanced features you wouldn’t believe it. 
(Delta).  
Also, we have the status quo of today, and we know what 
comes in one year, but our sales people that talk to the 
customer, they rather want to talk about horsepower and 
kilowatts than these new technologies. (Delta).  
Our dealers did not use the time to convey positive 
experiences to demonstrate value. (Delta) 
4.3  External barriers 
Industrial buying culture and relationships: 
Smart services represent a high-value offering with 
potential for improved profits for all stakeholders. 
Smart service provision also requires a significant 
upfront investment from the supplier company, hence 
requiring higher profitability to compensate for the 
investment. However, often the existing relationships 
and the prevailing industrial procurement culture favor 
short-term wins, exercise of high buyer-power, and 
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cost-based pricing. The focus is on transactional 
efficiency and arms-length relationships. The value 
focus of the smart services is often not aligned with the 
price focus of the industrial buying. 
It is difficult to get money from the customer for Smart 
Services. [...] In addition, many topics are so intermingled 
that you cannot always strictly separate them. [...] Because 
of this, we have miscellaneous products that overlap a bit. 
(Epsilon).  
With an old family business in Europe, customer 
relationship is everything – personal contacting, personal 
guidance. They only see value when someone is there 
personally. He doesn’t see value when someone he doesn’t 
know does something with a computer and then sends a huge 
bill. (Delta).  
Full-Service packages are mixed calculations. Costs 
arise when customers use the product until it is broken. With 
smart services, I can see problems before it breaks. To 
develop the business case and show value from reducing 
secondary damage, that is our job. (Delta) 
Smart services generally require a long-term 
orientation to customer relationships and high levels of 
trust and openness. 
 There is this permanent fear to be liable to recourse, that 
someone takes customer’s data. This fear is crippling. We do 
everything in our power to have legal security, to close all 
loopholes – and to tell everything that we know our customer. 
For instance, data does not go to the US. That simply won’t 
work. (Delta).  
Data security was a huge issue – so we trained our 
employees regarding the topic. We defined clear rules for 
each [smart service] session: The customer initiates it, and 
the customer ends it. [...] We obligated ourselves not to 
analyze any data, except the customer gives his express 
permission. This way we established trust. (Gamma).  
Data security is the biggest issue in Germany and in 
Europe. We have found in many surveys that customers are 
highly critical regarding unrestricted access to their data. 
(Delta) 
Reputation and brand image: For many of the 
case companies their existing brand as a product 
company, as well as the reputation as service provider 
represent a significant perceptional barrier to 
overcome. 
We are perceived as a product company by our 
customers, less as a solution or service provider. (Beta) 
Unwillingness to outsource: Service provision 
most of often involves change in the organizational 
boundaries: the customer outsources a business 
function to the supplier. Customers are often unwilling 
to give up resources and capabilities, fearing future loss 
of competitive advantage, unhealthy dependence, and 
similar consequences. 
[Our customers] don’t want to be dependent at the 
moment because they are afraid to lose capabilities to 
maintain and service their machines on their own. However, I 
think there will be change in the next couple of years due to 
cost pressure as well as rising complexity of systems that 
necessitate highly trained specialists. (Alpha) 
Non-matching solution visions: Perhaps relating 
to the inability to build value propositions, customers 
and service suppliers often have deviating views on 
solution scope. What represents an undividable bundle 
of activities, capabilities and resources for a customer, 
may include undesirable demands for the service 
provider. 
Customers have never told us what they expect. They only 
tell us when expectations haven’t been met. – The customers 
are not communicating specific numbers because he is 
unaware of them. But inwardly he has expectations that are 
based on experiences that he had. (Delta).  
The customer expects that our [Smart Services] are so 
capable software-wise, that the integration of all his different 
software systems works. Linking data to the customer in his 
way of expressing himself and for different systems is the 
biggest challenge, for this we need IT from external 
professionals. (Delta).  
Preventive maintenance will lead to fewer direct contacts 
with the customer. [...] At some point, the customer will say‚ 
this is too expensive’ – because he doesn’t have any machine-
down experiences any longer. (Delta).  
Customer expectations are clear. If these cannot be met 
adequately with the current offering, we are deliberately non-
transparent with our customers. Arising issues are avoided 
by offering all-in packages that transfer potential risks from 
customer to us. (Delta). 
The Table 2 summarizes the internal barriers, 
resource and capability gaps, and external barriers to 
implementing smart services. 
Table 2. Internal barriers, capability 
gaps, and external barriers to adoption of 
smart services 
Internal 
barriers 
Resource and 
capability gaps 
External 
barriers 
Management 
culture, 
Identity, 
Legitimacy 
Inability to provide 
smart services, 
Access to 
influence, 
Governance 
infrastructure, Lack 
of resources, 
Insufficient 
information on 
installed base, 
Cost-benefit of 
installed base 
modernization, 
Unclear legal status 
of the information, 
Inability to build 
value propositions, 
Inability to 
communicate value 
Industrial 
buying culture 
and 
relationships, 
Reputation and 
brand image, 
Unwillingness 
to outsource, 
Non-matching 
solution visions 
 
5. Discussion 
Our study investigates the emerging smart service 
business offering among six cases. Industrial service 
providers are responding to the changing needs of 
customers and emerging market opportunities by 
overcoming internal barriers and building new 
capabilities. In order to understand which factors seem 
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to inhibit the change we analyzed the change process in 
great detail.  Our analysis identified three internal 
barriers, nine resource and capability gaps, and four 
external barriers to the adoption and implementation of 
smart services within the industry. Thus quantitatively, 
the biggest set of barriers seem to lie in the resources 
and capabilities and in more detail the lack of 
managerial cognition of reconfiguration and 
disengagement. 
5.1 Theoretical implications 
 We build our analysis of the findings on the 
interplay between two organizational theories, the 
institutional logic [7] and dynamic capabilities [12], 
(see also [6]). First, within individual firms, the 
transformation requires change in the attitudes, beliefs, 
and norms that shape the business practices [34]. Gioia 
and Thomas [36] concluded that to induce change, the 
organization must be destabilized and convinced that 
there is a necessity for a different way of seeing and 
being. Drawing on the conceptualization of 
organizational and strategic change [37], this first stage 
of transformation is about “unfreezing” the current 
beliefs, attitudes, norms, and schemes of reasoning by 
managerial sensegiving. At this stage the processes 
should focus on motivating the need to change and 
communicating the new inspiring vision. Managers 
must create urgency for change. A rather common 
sensegiving strategy portrays the current (product) 
offering as becoming commoditized, leading to loss of 
competitiveness and low profitability. Then, from the 
capability perspective, our findings indicate that the 
case companies have deeply rooted routines and 
capabilities to effectively conduct their established 
business. Hence, the current (operational) capabilities 
and resources of the organizations likely feature high 
technical fitness, but deteriorating evolutionary fitness 
[12]. Agarval and Helfat [38] define strategic renewal 
of an organization to include the process of 
replacement of attributes of an organization that have 
the potential to substantially affect its long-term 
prospects. We conclude that managers may need to 
divest current operational capabilities and resources to 
create room for new operational capabilities with 
higher evolutionary fitness. Otherwise the firms would 
continue maintaining unprofitable technically fit 
routines, resources, and capabilities. Based on our 
findings, a salient example of the high technical but 
low evolutionary fitness is the sales function, which in 
many industrial companies have over time developed 
effective product sales practices, but which are 
becoming increasingly dysfunctional in meeting the 
new demands.  
The next stage in strategic renewal is about building 
a shared vision and new capabilities, routines, and 
resources to implement the new vision. The new vision 
needs to motivate the desirability of new smart services 
among the organizational actors. The greatest challenge 
for the managers during the this stage is to mobilize the 
firm’s dynamic capabilities to modify and extend its 
resource and capability base, and build entirely new 
resources and capabilities, to achieve evolutionary 
fitness. Our findings illustrate the magnitude of the 
challenge. Among many things, corporate training 
programs and incentive structures continue maintaining 
the established capabilities. Among the key capabilities 
to overcome the identified internal challenges is to 
align governance and incentives with the new vision, 
invest in value-based selling capabilities to build and 
communicate value [16], industrialize [19] the service 
provision, and segment to choose right customers for 
the smart services approach. 
Finally, the third “refreezing” stage involves 
influencing and accelerating the institutional change of 
beliefs and accepted business models and relationships 
within the surrounding business ecosystem to create 
receptivity for the new relationship logic, and align the 
visions about what is proper and “right” way to 
conduct business in the industry. Smart services as 
novel offerings require convincing proof of customer 
value. Hence, smart services are frequently a part of a 
broader, value-based strategy. As an example 
sensegiving strategy, Zeta has a established a global 
function to promote value-based relationships in 
industry events, and produce whitepapers, seminars, 
books, industrial benchmarking studies, and quantified 
reference stories to influence industrial relationship 
practices. To gain profound understanding of their 
customers and market opportunities, the case 
companies study their customer’s business processes 
and business drivers to identify and assess novel 
opportunities for value creation. Simultaneously, firms 
need to focus on internal exploitation efficiency and 
institutionalization of the new practices, resources, and 
(operational) capabilities to create a lasting impact. 
While the reconfiguration and development of new 
operational capabilities may have improved the 
evolutionary fitness of the firm, the technical fitness of 
the new capabilities and resources likely needs 
attention. The Table 3 summarizes our framework by 
explaining the different stages of transformation, as 
well as dividing the stages into institutional and 
capability related transformative actions. 
Table 3. Stages of overcoming barriers 
to change. 
Unfreezing 
Institutional 
perspective 
Managerial sensegiving to create 
urgency for change 
Capability 
perspective 
Divesting existing capabilities and 
resources to enable adoption of 
new capabilities and resources 
Building 
Institutional 
perspective 
Managerial sensegiving for new 
shared vision 
Capability 
perspective 
Application of the firm’s dynamic 
capabilities to reconfigure and 
renew the capability and resource 
base 
Refreezing 
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Institutional 
perspective 
Influencing industry-wide beliefs 
and norms to build receptivity for 
smart services 
Capability 
perspective 
Refining operational capabilities 
for exploitation efficiency 
 
5.2 Managerial Implications 
Our findings illustrate the impact of digitalization 
on industrial services, and contribute to the discussion 
of digitalization of industrial operations, service 
transformation, and the interplay between institutional 
change and dynamic capabilities to achieve 
organizational change (Table 3). 
For practicing managers the implications are rather 
straightforward: to achieve the potential of smart 
services, the managers need to engage in sensegiving to 
overcome the prevailing beliefs and rules, and prepare 
to renew the organizational capabilities and resources, 
focusing especially on the governance, incentives, and 
value-based capabilities, processes, and tools. It is also 
important to acknowledge, as our findings illustrate, 
that smart services are not just something to add on, but 
a part of a broader, paradigmatic change in industrial 
relationships and business models, and hence require 
simultaneous change in industrial beliefs, norms, and 
practices within the business ecosystem. Progressive 
companies need to effectuate the change within their 
network. 
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